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I.  PROLOGUE 
When I was approached to contribute to a symposium on using 
insights from socioeconomics in the law school classroom, I was 
profoundly embarrassed.  I recognized that by making presentations at 
conferences or through conversations with colleagues at such events, I 
often left them with the impression that my classes were well punctuated 
with concepts from the heterodox economic theories I use in my 
scholarship.  That impression was fraudulent.  My attempts to bring 
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genuine intellectual diversity into the classroom precipitated a collision 
with institutional racism; in deference to what remained of my emotional 
and physical health after that encounter, I have made only the most 
subtle subsequent references to heterodox economic theory in the 
classroom.  Thus, I was confronted with the option of perpetuating my 
fraud by writing a paper in which I would pretend to teach in ways that I 
do not, or to write about the things I may someday teach when I have 
regained the emotional and physical constitution to reengage in the battle 
to confront and disempower the ideologies of subordination.  I have 
chosen to do the latter.  All the events described in this Article occurred 
at the Beasley School of Law of Temple University in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania during the period August 1999 through June 2000. 
II.  INTRODUCTION 
Throughout much of the legal community, the term “economics” evokes 
memories of undergraduate micro- and macroeconomic courses.  At 
most American colleges and universities, these courses focus almost 
exclusively on neoclassical economic theory,1 which forms the foundation 
of what is thought of as mainstream economics in the United States.  For 
law school professors, the term may also bring to mind the Coase 
Theorem,2 Cardozo’s proximate causation conjecture,3 and a number of 
 
 1. See Charles R.P. Pouncy, Contemporary Financial Innovation: Orthodoxy and 
Alternatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 505, 540–41 (1998). Neoclassical economics describes the economy as a state of equilibrium, in which the forces of supply and demand interact to achieve optimal allocation of society’s resources.  The focus of neoclassical economics is on the decision-making activity of entrepreneurs, households and firms.  It assumes that economic decision-making is voluntary, informed and rational (i.e., utility maximizing).  The models used in neoclassical economics are based on transactions occurring in exchange (i.e., barter) markets, in which perfect competition prevails.  In these markets, goods are exchanged for goods, with money serving only as a neutral intermediary in the exchange.  Economic models based on exchange markets also assume gross substitution effects.  The axiom of gross substitution states that the demand for good A will change only in response to a pricing differential between good A and a substitute product.  Exchange transactions also are envisioned as being costlessly reversible, and as occurring in an ergodic environment, in which there are no financial institutions.  The market becomes the instrument of allocation, and individual self-interested economic decisions collectively achieve an optimal societal equilibrium. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 2. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).  The Coase Theorem was a response to Arthur Cecil Pigou’s conclusion that the ability of firms to externalize some of their costs of production, such as the ability of a manufacturer to force the costs of dealing with the pollution its manufacturing processes produce on the surrounding community.  Pigou concluded that this problem was best   
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concepts that have crossed what has become an all too permeable barrier 
between orthodox economic theory and judicial opinions.4  Included 
among such transplants we find opportunity costs, transaction costs, and 
other terms.5  However, few law professors and, I suspect, even fewer 
 
resolved by regulatory intervention.  Id. at 28–29, 41.  Coase, however, suggested that property rights between the producer of externalities and those impacted by it could be balanced through private contracts to achieve an efficient result.  Id. at 39–44; see also JÜRG NIEHANS, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THEORY 320–23 (1990). 
 3. See generally Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).  4. The neoclassical economic paradigm represents economic orthodoxy in the United States.  Thus, the terms are often used interchangeably.  For example, Frances Woolley writes, “Perhaps the most fruitful approach is simply to define neoclassical economics as ‘mainstream, orthodox economics’ or to ‘think of traditional or neoclassical economics as that which is represented in intermediate text books.”’  Frances R. Woolley, The Feminist Challenge to Neoclassical Economics, 17 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 485, 486 (1993) (quoting MARK BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS OR HOW ECONOMISTS EXPLAIN 160 (1980)).  Similarly, Johan Deprez writes, “In opposition to the neoclassical or Chicago School perspectives, there exist a variety of other economics paradigms.  In one way or another, these heterodox perspectives reject key foundational elements of the orthodox schools of thought.”  Johan Deprez, Risk, 
Uncertainty, and Nonergodicity in the Determination of Investment-Backed 
Expectations: A Post Keynesian Alternative to Posnerian Doctrine in the Analysis of 
Regulatory Takings, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1221, 1233 (2001) (footnote omitted); see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 7, 23–26 (1985) (describing economic orthodoxy in the post-World War II period); Timothy A. Canova, 
The Disorders of Unrestricted Capital Mobility and the Limits of the Orthodox 
Imagination: A Critique of Robert Solomon, Money on the Move: The Revolution in International Finance Since 1980 (Princeton University Press, 1999), 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 219 (2000) (using the term “orthodox” to describe dominant or mainstream economic thought); Thomas W. Joo, Contract, Property, and the Role of Metaphor in 
Corporations Law, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 779, 798 (2002) (describing the axioms of the neoclassical paradigm as “orthodox economics”); Nancy C. Staudt, Constitutional 
Politics and Balanced Budgets, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1116 n.50 (1998) (contrasting the theory of “constitutional economics” with orthodox economic theory).  5. The term “opportunity cost,” as employed by economists, refers to the opportunities an individual foregoes as a consequence of choosing one course of action from a number of potential alternatives.  Gerald J. Postema, Liberty in Equality’s 
Empire, 73 IOWA L. REV. 55, 74 (1987).  The concept of opportunity costs has been used in the bankruptcy context to determine “those amounts that an undersecured creditor would have earned if it had been permitted to foreclose on its collateral upon default, sell the collateral, and re-invest the proceeds, which the stay prevents.”  In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 793 F.2d 1380, 1403 (5th Cir. 1986).  The concept is used in various areas, including in discussing the best way to set attorney fee awards in civil rights litigation.  Bruce H. Kobayashi & John R. Lott, Jr., In Defense of Criminal 
Defense Expenditures and Plea Bargaining, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 397, 407–08 (1996); see also Christine Jolls et al., Theories and Tropes: A Reply to Posner & Kelman, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1593, 1600 (1998) (using the concept in law and economics discourse generally); Neil K. Komesar, Exploring the Darkness: Law, Economics, and Institutional 
Choice, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 465, 468 (using the concept in analyzing institutional choice). 
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lawyers fully appreciate the observation that economics is merely a 
discipline, not a science.  The fact that it is a discipline based on highly 
questionable, if not improbable, assumptions is discussed in legal 
scholarship on occasion,6 but I suspect this observation is less frequently 
discussed in law school classrooms.  Moreover, the possibility that 
mainstream economics can be viewed primarily as an ideologically 
based signifying system whose normative function appears to be the 
legitimization of current distributions of assets, resources, and 
opportunities is rarely discussed anywhere in this society;7 so, the 
absence of such discussions in the law school classroom, while 
unfortunate, is not surprising. 
 
Transaction costs are the costs of trading goods and services that are incurred in addition to price.  THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 432 (David W. Pearce ed., 4th ed. 1992).  The concept was popularized by Oliver Williamson, who took the position that “the economic institutions of capitalism have the main purpose and effect of economizing on transactions costs.”  OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ON THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 17 (1985). 
 6. See, e.g., Canova, supra note 4, at 219. While economics is unable to predict events or to offer solutions with any degree of certainty, the discipline’s pretentions as a value-neutral science have often permitted orthodox economists to rely on flawed assumptions, and to continue offering explanations and prescriptions without any sense of humility for the possibilities of their own errors. 
Id.; Deprez, supra note 4, at 1222–23 (contrasting Keynes’s emphasis on uncertainty in expectations formation with orthodox theory’s view of expectational certainty); James R. Hackney, Jr., “Law and Neoclassical Economics”: A Response to Commentaries, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 163, 163–64 (1998) (discussing his efforts to unmask the political nature of neoclassical theory’s treatment of allocation and distribution).  7. Charles R.P. Pouncy, Stock Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa: Western Legal 
Institutions as a Component of the Neo-Colonial Project, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 85, 87–89 (2002). Orthodox economics, the neoclassical paradigm, requires the adoption of a number of highly unrealistic assumptions about the way both people and markets behave.  Neoclassical theory assumes that humans are primarily and consistently motivated by the goal of maximizing their personal self-interest as they understand it.  However, cognitive theory has convincingly demonstrated that humans employ a range of decisional heuristics that result in decision making that exhibits consistent biases away from the theoretical predictions of neoclassical theory.  In contrast, heterodox theories tend to perceive human behavior as being embedded in social processes, which for example, structure the way humans perceive and react to information.  Institutional theory also perceives the nature of its inquiry differently than does the neoclassical paradigm.  The neoclassical paradigm seeks to construct models which emulate the laws of nature, particularly physics.  Institutional economists base their analyses on their examination of the behavior of real economies in historic time; therefore, the institutional approach is more likely to produce results consistent with the reality of human processes.  Finally, institutional economics uses the concept of increasing opportunity, a dynamic expanding view of what is possible, as its value premise.  The neoclassical paradigm seeks the result that is efficient with no real concern about the consequences of efficiency on the telos of humanity. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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Therefore, it also should not be surprising that law professors and 
others who come from backgrounds that have been marginalized and 
oppressed by the policy instruments constructed using neoclassical 
economic theory, both generally and as it has infiltrated the law and 
legal thinking, would devote greater effort to interrogating mainstream 
economic theory than those who benefit from the ideologically 
determined distributions of assets, resources, and opportunities that this 
system achieves.8  For me, the results of such study have led to an 
increasing appreciation of the usefulness and importance of the schools 
of heterodox economics in understanding the structure and consequences 
of law and law based societal interventions and a desire to share such 
insights with my students. 
However, as a person of color functioning in an environment in which 
white racism is assumed to be either normative or precipitated by the 
behavior of people of color, introducing heterodox analyses of business 
law becomes a process necessarily fraught with danger.  Unlike 
orthodox economics, heterodox economic theories examine the 
relationships between groups such as socioeconomic classes, races, and 
genders, as well as the role played by the distribution and maintenance 
of power and power relationships.9  Therefore, using heterodox analyses 
in teaching standard law school courses can generate hostility toward the 
messenger whose message results in a critical examination of unearned 
privileges and the institutional structures that support and perpetuate 
them.10  Heterodox economic analyses also favor conscious democratic decisionmaking rather than the caprice of the market.11   However, in our 
society, free-market dogma has been conflated with freedom itself, 
 
 8. WILLIAM M. DUGGER, UNDERGROUND ECONOMICS: A DECADE OF INSTITUTIONALIST DISSENT xxi–xxii (1992). 
 9. See, e.g., Howard J. Sherman, A Holistic-Evolutionary View of Racism, 
Sexism, and Class Inequality, in INEQUALITY: RADICAL INSTITUTIONALIST VIEWS ON RACE, GENDER, CLASS, AND NATION 39, 43–51 (William M. Dugger ed., 1996). 
 10. See Pamela J. Smith, Teaching the Retrenchment Generation: When Sapphire 
Meets Socrates at the Intersection of Race, Gender, and Authority, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 53, 60 (1999).  Noting that the 1980s brought increasing levels of racial segregation in housing and consequentially in education, Professor Smith argues that current law school students tend to be racially isolated, which can result in hostility towards professors of color in the classroom by students who perceive the presence of professors of color as a political challenge to the ideologies of white privilege and white superiority.  Id. at 60–65.  11. Edyth S. Miller, Seen Through a Glass Darkly: Competing Views of Equality 
and Inequality in Economic Thought, in INEQUALITY: RADICAL INSTITUTIONALIST VIEWS 
ON RACE, GENDER, CLASS, AND NATION, supra note 9, at 87, 89. 
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rendering a critical assessment of market processes the equivalent of 
advocating totalitarianism.12  The fact that heterodox economic theory 
provides useful platforms for the discussion of class, race, gender, and 
markets makes it an excellent vehicle for discussion of the ideological 
components of business law.  However, the use of such theories in 
contemporary law classrooms, particularly by professors of color or 
members of other marginalized groups, can make such professors 
lightning rods both for those students who are particularly committed to 
the preservation of unearned privilege and power and for the institutional 
processes that have arisen in law schools to maintain the current 
distribution of power, privilege, and authority. 
Thus, for me, the task of introducing aspects of heterodox economic 
theory into my classes in Business Associations, Banking Law, and 
Corporate Finance largely has been postponed to some future date.  It 
will take more than a few post-tenure months for me to once again 
attempt to introduce undisguised heterodox economic concepts into the 
law school classroom.  Unfortunately, my initial attempts to do so 
unleashed a plague of insult and abuse upon me by both students and 
administrators and also forced me to acknowledge that the vast majority 
of my colleagues were oblivious both to the mechanisms of institutional 
racism and to my expectations of equality.  Therefore, this Article 
speaks to the future, when I have sufficiently recovered to once again 
attempt to bring intellectual diversity into my classrooms through the 
introduction of heterodox economic thought. 
III.  HETERODOXY 
“Before economics became a ‘science,’ it was philosophy, concerned 
with questions of ‘the good’ for the individual and the nation.”13  Arising 
in the time of the Enlightenment, during which the patterns of regularity 
we now recognize as the modern sciences were being uncovered, 
philosophers looked for such patterns, inter alia, in the behavior of 
features of the economy.  Thus, the search began to discover the natural 
laws of economics, which, like the laws of physics, operated automatically 
and which, like the laws of gravity, were undefeatable.14  The classical 
 
 12. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 8 (1982).  Economic arrangements play a dual role in the promotion of a free society.  In the one hand, freedom in economic arrangements is itself a component of freedom broadly understood, so economic freedom is an end in itself.  In the second place, economic freedom is also an indispensable means toward the achievement of political freedom. 
Id.  13. Pouncy, supra note 1, at 539 (footnotes omitted).  14. See E. RAY CANTERBERY, THE MAKING OF ECONOMICS  35–36 (1976). 
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economists Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, and Karl 
Marx proposed various ways of looking at the macro economy; 
however, perhaps as a function in living in the early stages of the 
machine age, mechanical regularity became the holy grail of economic 
thinking.15  To achieve this degree of regularity, Leon Walras removed 
the worrisome realities of capital-intensive production, capital assets, 
and financial institutions from his model of the economy in order to 
develop mathematical statements that would simulate in the economy 
the same homeostasis and equilibrium found in the natural world.16 
To separate his way of thinking about the economy from what had 
preceded it, Thorstein Veblen17 characterized the intellectual progeny of 
Marx, Mill, Smith, and Adams as neoclassical economists as he elaborated 
theories that would become known as institutional economics.18  Despite 
the challenges presented to neoclassical economics by John Maynard 
Keynes when his understandings of the economy were able to explain 
and remedy the persistent unemployment of the 1920s and 1930s in the 
United States and Europe in the face of neoclassical impotence to 
 
 15. Mirowski argues that the mechanical pretensions of economic theory result from a conscious effort on the part of the nineteenth century progenitors of neoclassical economics to create a “scientific” economics. The dominant school of economic theory in the West, which we shall call “neoclassical economics,” has in the past often been praised and damned by being held up to the standards of physics . . . .  [T]he resemblances of the theories are uncanny, and one reason they are uncanny is because the progenitors of neoclassical theory boldly copied the reigning physical theories in the 1870s . . . .  [T]hose neoclassicals did not imitate physics in a desultory or superficial manner; no, they copied their models mostly term for term and symbol for symbol, and said so. PHILIP MIROWSKI, MORE LIGHT THAN HEAT 3 (1989).  16. Pouncy, supra note 1, at 539–41 & n.215.  17. Thorstein Veblen (1857–1928), one of the founders and promoters of institutional economic theory in the United States, rejected the efforts of economists to establish in economics the regularity found in the physical sciences.  Instead, he viewed the economy from an evolutionary perspective.  See generally Steven G. Medema et al., 
Institutional Law and Economics, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 418, 421–22 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).  For Veblen, what would become known as neoclassical economics sought to impose what Veblen found to be a false order and predictability of economic activity, in part due to its focus on the activity of the individual.  Instead of the individual, Veblen focused his economic thinking on institutional processes and the ways that real economies, rather than models, evolve and change over time.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics 
Movement, 42 STAN. L. REV. 993, 1019–20 (1990).  Veblen’s major works include The 
Theory of the Leisure Class (1899) and The Theory of the Business Enterprise (1904).  18. NIEHANS, supra note 2, at 161–63. 
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address this condition,19 neoclassical theory survived by simply 
importing Keynesian viewpoints into what would be characterized as the 
neoclassical synthesis.20  Reduced to mathematical expressions and 
popularized by Samuelson, the Keynesian policy instruments imported 
in the neoclassical syntheses were instrumental in ending widespread 
post-Depression unemployment and in strengthening both the position of 
the U.S. economy and the financial security of both the working class 
and the middle class in the United States mid-century.21  Treating 
Keynes’s insights into the economy as a special case limited to issues of 
unemployment, the neoclassical synthesis went on to find some of its 
strongest proponents in the U.S. legal academy.22  Although the original 
U.S. law and economics jurisprudence was inspired by and relied on 
institutional economics,23 this new legal theory and its corresponding 
jurisprudence would be based on the most primitive and most 
contestable features of the neoclassical synthesis, which rendered 
transparent its ideological agenda of protecting the current distribution 
of assets, resources, opportunities, power, and privilege. 
As the noted institutionalist theorist William Dugger has said, 
“Alienated people reject the values, beliefs, and meanings of the world 
into which they are born. . . .  People rebelling against their economy 
find contradiction in it.”24  When I was confronted with an economic 
theory whose proponents increase unemployment to lower business 
costs, which views race and gender-based discrimination as a rational 
response, and which valorizes the current distribution of assets, 
resources, and opportunities because they are achieved by market 
processes, I was compelled to look at alternative understandings of the 
economy and its operation. 
The world of economic heterodoxy at its best is a world of mutually 
interacting understandings about the way real economies operate in real 
 
 19. Pouncy, supra note 1, at 543–44. 
 20. Id. at 544.  21. Eichner credits Samuelson with popularizing what would become the neoclassical synthesis by reducing Keynesian principles into mathematical expressions.  Alfred S. Eichner, Introduction to A GUIDE TO POST-KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS 9–10 (Alfred S. Eichner ed., 1979).  Keynes’s insight that the persistent unemployment of the Depression era resulted not from dislocations of supply but rather from liquidity preferences that stifled demand for employment was instrumental in the development of New Deal policies that helped alleviate mass unemployment.  See PAUL DAVIDSON, POST KEYNESIAN MACROECONOMIC THEORY 20–22 (1994); JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 148–49, 168–69 (1936); Ari Afilalo, Not in My Backyard: Power and Protectionism in U.S. Trade Policy, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 749, 758 (2002).  22. Pouncy, supra note 1, at 544.  23. Charles R.P. Pouncy, The Rational Rogue: Neoclassical Economic Ideology in 
the Regulation of the Financial Professional, 26 VT. L. REV. 263, 314 (2002).  24. DUGGER, supra note 8, at xxi. 
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time.  Although there are marked differences between institutionalists, 
post-Keynesians, Marxians, and others who reject the validity of the 
neoclassical synthesis, they are united in their concern that the 
ideologically derived consequences of these neoclassical policy 
instruments do not serve the long-term best interests of the people and 
the planet.  Also, institutionalists, post-Keynesians, and Marxians all 
have much to contribute to our understanding of legal processes and the 
functioning of our legal institutions. 
For example, each of these economic schools of thought presents 
perspectives which are germane to teaching law generally and to 
teaching business law specifically.  From institutionalism we obtain, 
inter alia, the concept of transaction costs, which has been absorbed by 
the neoclassical synthesis;25 more importantly, however, institutional 
economics also provides us with the concept of the institution as the 
organizing principle for society.  “An institution is a socially constructed 
belief system about the way things are and the way things should be that 
organizes human thought and action.  An institution is not an objective 
physical phenomenon, but a human mental construct.”26  To the extent 
that individuals adhere to the beliefs present in an institution, they 
operationalize it by transforming those beliefs into action.27  So, for 
example, an understanding that legal constructs and doctrines are 
institutions permits an understanding that changes in our collective 
beliefs about the way things are should result in changes to our legal 
institutions.  This view is an important component of the observation 
that economies are not equilibrating interactions between supply and 
demand, but are an evolving set of financial, social, cultural, and 
historical processes which, like other evolutionary processes, interact 
without any particular goal or teleological perspective unless one is 
imposed upon them. 
From the post-Keynesians, we get the view that the goals of stable 
prices and full employment are not incompatible28 and that inflation is 
best understood as resulting from conflicts over the distribution of 
 
 25. Id. at 95–96, 318.  26. Johan Stein, How Institutions Learn: A Socio-Cognitive Perspective, 31 J. ECON. ISSUES 729, 730 (1997).  27. WENDELL GORDON, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: THE CHANGING SYSTEM 16 (1980).  28. Eileen Appelbaum, The Labor Market, in A GUIDE TO POST-KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS 100, 104–05 (Alfred S. Eichner ed., 1979). 
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income and output rather than as the result of demand excesses.29  
Therefore, rather than controlling inflation by imposing austerity 
measures on workers, the policy instruments of post-Keynesian theory 
would confront inflation by adjusting the relationship between wages, 
profits, and prices, thereby spreading both the burdens and benefits of 
the capitalist modes of production.30  This view lays bare the economic 
triage of corporate downsizing as merely a readjustment in the 
relationship between wages and profits, one which favors profits over 
wages. 
The Marxian school provides us with the notion of overdetermination, 
namely, “the ceaseless dialectical interplay between the process of 
theory and all other processes in society.”31  An appreciation of 
overdetermination illustrates the contingency and contestability of all 
theoretical constructs.  As each theory has its own indicia of truth, each 
theory’s understanding of “reality” and of the truths associated with that 
reality is different.32  Theory becomes what its practitioners understand it 
to be.  Therefore, attempting to understand the economy and economic 
processes by reference to particular theoretical constructions can 
produce an analysis that is consistent with the theory being applied, but 
that has no necessary relationship to objective reality. 
So, for example, where a neoclassical analysis would recognize a 
sequence of activities as illustrating a linear cause and effect relationship, a 
Marxian analysis is more likely to see a much more complex, nonlinear 
interaction between an event and all of the other processes that necessarily 
construct and contribute to that event.  Thus, the way one understands 
economic causality within the context of a particular economic phenomena 
depends on the particular economic theory being employed by the 
observer.  Therefore, for example, an overdetermined discussion of 
unemployment cannot be focused around the issue of the demand for 
labor, as it would if using the linear causal mechanism recognized by 
neoclassical theory, but instead must also be informed by the relative 
distribution of profits between workers and owners, the need to transfer 
 
 29. Alfred S. Eichner, Introduction, in A GUIDE TO POST-KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS, 
supra note 28, at 3, 16–17.  30. Peter Kenyon, Pricing, in A GUIDE TO POST-KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS, supra note 28, at 34, 43–44.  31. STEPHEN A. RESNICK & RICHARD D. WOLFF, KNOWLEDGE AND CLASS: A MARXIAN CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 7 (1987).  Thus, different theories no more capture the essence of the social totality than do different cuisines or different modes of production or different systems of laws.  Each of these is a constituent process of the social totality; each is overdetermined by all other processes and participates in the overdetermination of all. 
Id. at 9. 
 32. Id. at 6. 
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labor from commercial to military uses, the amount of societal resources 
invested in education, the optimal prison population, and other factors.  
Because the  demand for labor as a variable is ideologically opaque, 
focusing an analysis at that level obviates an examination of the various, 
more ideologically transparent processes that overdetermine 
unemployment.  Similarly, an individual does not become unemployed 
because, for example, her skills become obsolete, but because of the 
relationships between the various societal processes within which she is 
embedded and her ability to be employed. 
These insights and many others provided by heterodoxy suggest that 
neither “the law” nor neoclassically inspired law and economics is 
neutral.  But, whether deployed separately or in concert, they act as 
interventions in consensus reality, our shared notions of the way things 
are, to produce ideologically determined consequences that favor the 
current distribution of assets, resources, and opportunities. 
IV.  THE MECHANISMS OF INSTITUTIONAL RACISM AND THE 
SUPPRESSION OF INTELLECTUAL DIVERSITY IN THE CLASSROOM: 
“LEGAL DECISION MAKING” 
I looked forward to teaching Legal Decision Making, a first-year legal 
process course, because it would provide me with an opportunity to 
compare and contrast the consequences of using different economic 
perspectives in analyzing the law.  I began the course segment devoted 
to the law and economics school of jurisprudence by asking the students 
to define or describe economics.  After obtaining the usual responses 
concerning the allocation of scarce assets among various potential uses, I 
attempted to explore the concept of scarcity.  The students were readily 
able to recognize the disconnect between theoretical and real world 
notions of scarcity.  I believe they were prepared to see scarcity as an 
issue not of quantity but of distribution and from there to entertain the 
view that distribution was not a function of economics, but of ideology. 
However, on the evening following that preliminary discussion, one of 
the students felt obliged to post a critique of my approach to the 
assumptions underlying neoclassical theory on a listserver maintained 
for this particular class by the school.  The critique began, “With all due 
respect to Professor Pouncy, I believe he was mistaken several times during 
today’s class discussion,” and went on to provide the “Microeconomics 
101” analyses for the points I had raised.  In responding to the student, I 
encouraged him to explore the distinction between what he “knew” and 
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what he assumed and pointed out, with no undue gentleness, that the 
positions he advocated were ideologically constructed and had consequences 
that were disastrous for large numbers of people.  Of course, the students 
revolted, with the principal complaint being that I behaved as if I 
thought I knew more than they did. 
When summoned to defend myself by Robert Reinstein, Dean of 
Temple’s Beasley School of Law, I pointed out that the students’ 
complaints were a thinly veiled challenge of my authority to profess 
based on my race.  Unfortunately, at that point, I had not applied an institutional 
analysis to my situation, or I might have been better prepared for what 
was to follow.  I was told that I would have no future with that organization 
if I blamed the students for their racism because their racism was 
evidence of a teaching problem; the students would not behave in a 
racist manner if I was not doing something to make them behave that 
way.  Ultimately, I was told that “my problem” was that I had never gotten 
used to racism.  I was instructed to get used to racism and everything 
would be fine.  In fact, this was advanced as the only reasonable course 
of action because racism was not going to go away.  As I listened, 
dumbfounded, I thought of my ancestors, packed into a slave ship on 
their way to what would become America.  I recognized that the same 
diminished humanity that animated their captors continued to animate 
mine, and, as I often do, I wondered again what it might be like to be free. 
From an institutional perspective, this organization was using its 
supposed “student-centeredness” as an instrument to maintain the 
relative distribution of professorial authority between black and white 
faculty members.  Upon their arrival, the students were informed that 
they were the best judges of a professor’s performance in the classroom, 
and shortly after my arrival, I was informed that it was not permissible 
for me to observe that the students’ assessments of my performance 
might be based more on my race than on actual indicia of my teaching 
ability.  Thus, by permitting the students to replicate the processes of 
institutional racism while insulating them from any critique based on 
their commitment to white privilege and white superiority, this law 
school hides its institutional racist processes under the cloak of its 
“student-centeredness.” 
I recognized that the personal risks associated with any genuine effort 
to add to the intellectual and cultural diversity of this organization were 
too great.33  The vast majority of my students have been privileged by 
 
 33. Nevertheless, unconvinced of the depth of this organization’s commitment to its institutional racist processes, in January 2000 I detailed my experiences as part of a presentation I made at a commemoration of the birth of Martin Luther King, Jr.  After the presentation, only one relatively marginalized white colleague behaved as if the treatment I received was at all problematic. 
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the distribution of assets, resources, and opportunities achieved by the 
policy instruments of neoclassical economics.  More importantly, even 
those who were not so privileged had nevertheless inculcated many of 
the assumptions of the neoclassical paradigm, such as methodological 
individualism, economic rationality, and the value of efficiency in 
evaluating economic results.  Methodological individualism sufficiently 
eviscerates any notion of class consciousness.  As Thorstein Veblen’s 
work illustrated more than one hundred years ago, “Americans in the 
lower strata seldom think of the upper strata in the bitter terms of 
exploitation.  Rather than feel resentment, those in the lower strata feel 
envy.  They do not want to overthrow their exploiters.  They want to 
move up into the higher strata themselves.”34 
Perceiving that there would be no institutional support for my efforts 
to bring the intellectual diversity provided by heterodox economic 
theory into the classroom, I followed the dean’s advice.  I tried to teach 
in ways that would present no challenge to the ideologies of white 
privilege and white superiority.  I tried to teach in ways that would not 
require my students to acknowledge that I knew more than they did or 
that my intellect was in any way more developed than their own.  I 
taught from within the confines of an intellectual and emotional 
straightjacket.  The students and the administration were content, as was 
my therapist, who now had no concerns about financing her children’s 
education. 
However, I did begin to create teaching notes for when I was no 
longer colored.  These notes contain observations and analyses that I 
would use in introducing heterodox economic analyses into the 
classroom should I ever determine that I could do so without further 
injury to what remained of my dignity. 
V.  TEACHING ABOUT THE CORPORATION 
The neoclassically inspired theory of the firm takes as one of its 
starting points the ideologically generated view that private ordering is 
the preferred way of structuring financial transactions.35  Although 
 
 34. William M. Dugger, Four Modes of Inequality, in INEQUALITY: RADICAL INSTITUTIONALIST VIEWS ON RACE, GENDER, CLASS, AND NATION, supra note 9, at 21, 31. 
 35. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical 
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1516–17 (1989); Geoffrey P. Miller, The 
Rise and Fall of the Classical Corporation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1677, 1687 (1992) (describing Milton Friedman, Gary Becker, and others as neoclassical economists who appreciate 
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unequal bargaining power is recognized, it is thought to be ameliorated 
either by the competitive processes supposedly present in markets or, as 
a last resort, by regulatory intervention.36  This belief in the assumed 
benefits of private ordering rests in significant part on a belief in 
economic rationality as the preferred explanation of human motivation, 
which in turn generates the processes of methodological individualism 
as the appropriate focus for understanding financial and economic 
behavior.  As a result, students are presented with the legally determined 
economic status quo as the only legitimate way of organizing and 
operating business enterprises and are encouraged to think that an economic 
system fueled by resource consumption is sustainable in perpetuity. 
At the heart of this process are the rules of fiduciary responsibility and 
their interaction with the purposes of the corporation.  Although 
contemporary events forcefully suggest the illusory nature of fiduciary 
responsibilities in the management of the U.S. corporation, there is little 
in the neoclassical bag of tricks to explain “bad decisionmaking” as 
opposed to self-interested decisionmaking.  Although bad decisions may 
serve the personal interests of the decisionmaker, the processes by which 
they come about are exogenous to the firm, as opposed to self-interested 
decisionmaking, which tends to arise through endogenous processes.  If 
we list each of these issues: private ordering, economic rationality, 
methodological individualism, and fiduciary duty, one can easily argue 
that the operation of each of these processes is justified by the role that it 
plays in neoclassical theory.  However, if we remove the imprimatur of 
orthodox economics and look at these processes solely from the 
perspective of their distributive consequences, corporate law begins to 
look a lot less like an institution of U.S. democracy and more like a 
relative of contemporary Russian plutocracy.  The institutions of private 
ordering, economic rationality, methodological individualism, and 
fiduciary duty concentrate power in the hands of corporate managers, 
whose exercise of this power is subject only to very limited review.  
These individuals then use such power to their personal or class 
advantage while giving the appearance of devotion to shareholder and 
corporate concerns. 
A.  The Process as a Unit of Analysis 
To encourage students to look critically at the institutions of the 
corporation and corporate governance, I will rely to a great extent on 
 
markets as achieving beneficial private orderings and view regulation with skepticism). 
 36. See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1, 85 n.448 (1999) (quoting Hovenkamp for the proposition that unequal bargaining power in market transactions does not justify the imposition of regulation). 
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some of the core principles of antiessentialist Marxian thought.  The law 
of corporate governance constructs the process of corporate 
decisionmaking in a rather linear fashion.  Corporate directors comply 
with their duty of care if their decisions are informed, rational, and made 
in good faith.37  Individual directors interact with each other, with 
corporate staff, and with experts in assessing relevant information and 
generating a decision.  Once made, this decision is insulated from 
serious further scrutiny by the operation of the business judgment rule, 
which presumes that the decisionmaking process complies with and 
fulfills the directors’ duty of care.38  However, within this construction 
of the corporate decisional process are embedded the basic assumptions 
of neoclassical economic theory.  First, that the appropriate unit of 
analysis and observation is the individual actor, whether a person, a firm, 
a household, or a nation state.39  Therefore, in the basic corporations 
course we spend most of our time examining the behavior of corporate 
managers from the perspective provided by the axiom “corporate 
directors act collectively but are judged individually.”40  Thus, the law 
understands the individual director in the same ways as the individual 
director is constructed by neoclassical economic theory, namely, as a 
fragmented set of preference functions with a limited range of 
motivating influences and, therefore, an equally limited range of 
decisional responses.41  The business judgment rule acts to limit the 
inquiry that shareholders can make into the decisional processes of 
directors and managers by presuming that managerial decisions are 
made in ostensible good faith with a reasonable amount of information 
and that such decisions bear some relationship to shareholder utility 
maximization and conform with the directors’ duty of care. 
However, Marxian analysis suggests that director decisionmaking 
occurs within a set of processes that includes, but is not limited to, the 
processes and institutions generated by the business judgment rule, other 
legal doctrines, and the broad range of societal processes and their 
associated institutions.  Thus, the corporate scandals de jour of the early 
1990s, unlike contemporary corporate scandals, did not involve accounting 
 
 37. JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS 179–80 (1997).  38. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).  39. Pouncy, supra note 23, at 272–73. 
 40. See, e.g., Eliopulos v. Knox, 848 P.2d 984, 988–89 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992).  Bank directors act collectively as a board of directors, rather than individually for the bank, but they can be held liable for individual as well as collective wrongs.  Id.  41. Pouncy, supra note 23, at 290. 
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fraud and associated fiduciary breaches, but the mismanagement of 
derivative instruments.  One observation flowing from that period was 
that corporate managers were encouraged to use derivative instruments 
by a process that appeared endogenous to the ranks of corporate 
management.  Corporate managers recognize that their decisions would 
play a significant role in the progress of their careers and further 
recognize that their decisions will be evaluated in relation to their 
consistency with the decisions of similarly placed managers.  The result 
of this process is that managerial decisions consistent with conventional 
decisionmaking and popular sentiment will be rewarded asymmetrically 
in a manner consistent with conventional decisionmaking.42  Thus, 
a manager might determine that using certain derivative instruments created, rather than ameliorated, certain risks.  Therefore, she would refuse to invest in such instruments despite the fact that most of her managerial peers in comparable firms were doing so.  In the short-term, such a manager is likely to be replaced with a member of the prevailing herd.  Assume, however, that despite her better judgment, the manager follows the lead of her peers.  She invests and ultimately suffers the significant losses that her peers also experience.  Despite the losses suffered, she and her peers will not be punished severely.  However, one who fails to jump on the bandwagon when the herd’s instincts prove to be correct will be punished severely.43 
The asymmetrical rewards mechanism cooperates with the business 
judgment rule so that managers recognize that their decisions will be 
insulated from scrutiny by the rule’s presumption, assuming these 
decisions are based on their consideration of a reasonable amount of 
information; this result follows even if the information underlying a 
particular decision includes the managers’ own assessment of the likely 
response of similarly situated managers to such a decision.  The 
processes of the asymmetrical reward structure never surface in a court’s 
analysis when it determines whether managers are entitled to the 
presumption of the business judgment rule; this result follows despite 
the fact that this process may have been a primary reason for the 
decision to use derivative products whose operation and risk the 
managers did not fully understand or appreciate.44  Thus, while the 
decisions of an individual manager can be explained by reference to the 
economic rationality heuristic, such an explanation is incomplete and 
therefore inaccurate to the extent that it does not consider the operation 
of other processes that enable us to perceive the individual manager’s 
decision as a function of a collective managerial class determination 
about the risks associated with acting in a manner contrary to the 
 
 42. Pouncy, supra note 1, at 564. 
 43. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 44. Id. 
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behavior of one’s peers.  When asked what role, if any, the asymmetrical 
reward structure should play in a court’s application of the business 
judgment rule presumption, students should appreciate that the business 
judgment rule, with its focus on the individual, is largely oblivious to 
sectoral processes like the asymmetric reward structure.  My suspicion is 
that although students will remain unconvinced that processes, like the 
asymmetrical reward structure, should play a role in assessing board 
decisionmaking, they will begin to look for other processes that impact 
board decisionmaking rather than focus exclusively on the decisional 
propensities of individual directors. 
B.  Organizational Culture and Cognitive Psychology 
Institutional economic theory can be read as calling for a “multivoiced 
analysis” of what we ordinarily would characterize as economic 
processes.  Law, ethics, and economics are viewed as interdependent 
variables “embedded in a web of causality that can only be discussed 
meaningfully” by employing a multidisciplinary analysis.45  Thus, to 
interrogate the processes that have resulted in our current spate of 
corporate ethical lapses, it is necessary to employ what John R. 
Commons46 called a “multilanguage analysis” using the languages of 
law, psychology, sociology, and economics in all of their diversity.47  
The ability to meaningfully use such an analysis is greatly advanced by 
contemporary developments in cognitive theory and organization studies 
that enhance our understandings of psychological and sociological 
 
 45. Pouncy, supra note 23, at 322.  46. While Veblen is thought of as having created the theoretical underpinnings of Institutional economics, John R. Commons (1874–1948) is viewed as creating the methodological foundations of institutional theory.  See generally Medema et al., supra note 17, at 427–30.  Commons identified “the transaction” as the proper analytical focus of economic behavior and was instrumental in developing the models upon which New Deal labor and social welfare legislation were based.  Harry Arthurs, Reinventing Labor 
Law for the Global Economy: The Benjamin Aaron Lecture, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 271, 278 (2001).  Commons’s major works include JOHN R. COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (1934); JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1924).  47. J. Dennis Chasse, The Transaction in a Many Language Hypothesis, 31 J. ECON. ISSUES 375, 375–76 (1997).  In his writings, Commons initially included physiology rather than sociology in his multilanguage analysis.  This was in keeping with institutional economics’ evolutionary perspective.  However, he would later reject physiology as a less than useful subjectivity and substitute the study of social relations in his analysis.  Joëlle Forest & Caroline Mehier, John R. Commons and Herbert A. Simon 
on the Concept of Rationality, 35 J. ECON. ISSUES 591, 592 n.1 (2001). 
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processes in the construction of human behavior and of behavioral 
responses to social processes. 
By following the institutionalist perspective and employing the 
analytical tools of cognitive theory, Joy v. North,48 a staple of corporate 
law casebooks, becomes susceptible to a different reading, a reading 
focused at the intersection of cognitive psychology and organizational 
culture.  Joy v. North was a derivative action brought by the stockholders 
of Citytrust Bancorp, Inc. against the corporation’s directors.  The 
shareholder alleged that the directors breached their duty of care to the 
corporation by a series of loans to a real estate developer that employed 
the son of the bank’s CEO.49 
One question the case raises is why the directors continued to make 
loans to the developer when the developer was in default on earlier 
loans, and it was clear that there was little chance that these loans would 
ever be repaid.  The standard analysis, consistent with neoclassical 
theory’s use of the individual as the appropriate unit of analysis, 
encourages the student to look for the individual or individuals who are 
responsible for such faulty decisionmaking.  The likely culprit is the 
bank’s CEO, Nelson North, who, through a combination of power and 
force of personality, dominated the board and forced them to make 
clearly inappropriate decisions. 
Cognitive theory, however, suggests a somewhat different analysis.  
Cognitive theory suggests that the way a problem is framed influences 
the way decisionmakers will choose from among available options.  For 
example, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman created an experiment in 
which the experimental subjects were asked to make decisions in the 
context of a health crisis situation.  The options the subjects chose were 
strongly influenced by whether the crisis was framed in terms of the 
number of people expected to live, as opposed to the number of people 
expected to die.  When the crisis was framed in the positive domain, 
namely, the number of people expected to survive, the experimental 
subjects chose risk-averse options.  However, when the crisis was 
framed in the negative domain, namely, the number of people expected 
to die, the experimental subjects chose risk-seeking options.50  
Although the mechanisms that result in these decisional processes are 
still subject to question, it is nevertheless clear that in many instances 
individuals will seek even greater risk when the problem is framed in 
terms of a choice between a range of losses.51 
 
 48. 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 49. Id. at 894–96.  50. Sandra J. Hartman & Beverly H. Nelson, Group Decision Making in the 
Negative Domain, 21 GROUP & ORG. MGMT. 146, 148 (1996). 
 51. Id. at 148–49. 
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Moreover, when it is a group decision rather than an individual 
decision, the likelihood is that the collective group response will amplify 
the most extreme response, whether risk-avoiding or risk-seeking, 
advanced by an individual group member.52  Additionally, one of the 
constellation of factors that predict risk behavior are the characteristics 
of the group making the decision.  These include group composition, 
cultural risk values, leader risk orientation, and organizational control 
systems.53  Thus, for example, a cohesive group located in a corporate 
culture with risk-seeking tendencies and led by an individual with risk-
seeking tendencies will make riskier decisions than a group with a 
different set of organizational characteristics. 
In Joy v. North, the directors’ decisionmaking was clearly framed in 
the negative domain.  The loan was in default, the bank’s auditors 
recommended that the bank establish a loss reserve for the loans equal to 
fifty percent of their value, and the Comptroller of the Currency advised 
the bank to inform its directors to consult with their personal attorneys 
when the bank sought to exceed regulatory restrictions on loans to one 
borrower.54  The corporate culture took its cues from the behavior of its 
CEO, who the court found to have completely dominated the bank’s 
management.55  When students are asked how they should advise a client 
corporation on the composition of its board, they readily recognize the 
value of board members capable of exercising decisional autonomy.  In 
the future, I also will ask whether cognitive theory offers any further 
suggestions to lawyers when advising their corporate clients on board 
composition.  My hope is that students may identify increased diversity 
as a means of preventing board domination while lowering the board’s 
tendency towards critique-suppressing group cohesion and developing a 
single frame of reference with respect to making a particular decision.  
However, I suspect that students will be surprised by the conclusion that 
psychological research can be used to argue that greater diversity within 
 
 52. Tatsuya Kameda & James H. Davis, The Function of the Reference Point in 
Individual and Group Risk Decision Making, 46 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 55, 71 (1990).  53. Sim B. Sitkin & Amy L. Pablo, Reconceptualizing the Determinants of Risk 
Behavior, 17 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 9, 12 (1992).  In addition to organizational characteristics, risk behavior is also influenced by individual characteristics—risk preferences, risk perceptions, and risk propensity—as well as by two problem-related characteristics—problem familiarity and problem framing.  Id. 
 54. Joy, 692 F.2d at 895. 
 55. Id. at 894. 
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leadership groups is a good thing.  I doubt they will embrace the idea, 
but I don’t believe they will be affirmatively hostile to it either.  At that 
point, I may use such a discussion to ask whether the failure to have a 
genuinely diverse board should be viewed as a breach of the directors’ 
duty of care. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
I do not believe that introducing any of the teaching points I have 
mentioned into the law school classroom present undue risks to white 
professors who might choose to raise them.  White professors enter the 
classroom with the presumptions of competence and authority bestowed 
by whiteness.  The mere presence of a professor of color who evidences 
a person of color consciousness is a threat to the ideologies of 
subordination, white privilege, and white superiority, thereby provoking 
a repressive institutional response.  However, professors of color in 
schools that have interrogated their institutions and intervened to prevent 
professors of color from being subjected to institutional racism are in a 
significantly better situation than the rest of us.  If students have been 
educated to recognize and to resist the process of institutional racism, 
then people of color, one of the natural constituencies for critical 
economic thought, will be freed to add genuine intellectual diversity to 
the study of the issues raised by the use of neoclassical economic theory 
in understanding business law issues. 
 
